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Abstract
Sacred values are moral foundations that may make public and political debates among groups hard to resolve. A taboo trade-off
framework offers the opportunity of measuring the inviolability and the “sacralization” of moral foundations. In this study, moral foundations
in a taboo trade-off framework were assessed in a convenience sample of Italians (N = 224) using a new measure to assess sacred values,
the Omission as a Compromise on Moral Foundations scale (OC-MF). The OC-MF measures the willingness of individuals to omit moral
foundations in exchange for money. It was predicted that Italian center and left-wing participants would be less willing to compromise
individualizing moral foundations as opposed to binding ones, and that center and right-wing participants would be less willing to
compromise on binding moral foundations than left-wing participants. Confirmatory Factor Analyses demonstrated the two-factor structure
of the OC-MF: individualizing and binding. As predicted, Repeated Measures Anova showed that political orientation was related with
differential adoptions of moral foundations as sacred values, with center and left-wing participants refusing to compromise more on
individualizing than on binding moral foundations. Moreover, left-wing participants were more willing to compromise on binding moral
foundations than center and right-wing participants. The OC-MF shows the hypothesized differences between Italian political groups and
offers a new understanding of moral reasoning. These findings provide opportunities for improving ideological debates concerning sacred
values.
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The Moral Compromises of Sacred Values
In many situations, people dislike making a trade-off between different choice alternatives, especially if choice
options mirror inviolable sacred values (Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000). Any moral value that
people implicitly or explicitly treat as having infinite or transcendental meaning that prohibits comparisons,
trade-offs, or other exchanges is referred to as a “sacred value” (Bartels, Bauman, Cushman, Pizarro, &
McGraw, 2015; Tetlock et al., 2000).
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Graham and Haidt (2012) argued that sacredness is crucial for understanding morality and it is a universal hu-
man propensity to invest people, places, times, and ideas with an importance which goes far beyond the utility
they possess. In particular, some goods, such as human life, rights, or health, are treated as having a transcen-
dental or sacred meaning that cannot be exchanged for secular values, especially those goods that can be
bought or sold (Bartels et al., 2015; Carmichael, Hubert, Reeves, & Schanche, 1994). Sacred values are not
always religious in character, because core secular values can be assumed as sacred and inviolable by a com-
munity (Graham & Haidt, 2012; Tetlock et al., 2000). Graham and Haidt (2012) explained that sacredness does
not require a God, because flags, national holidays and many other markers of collective solidarity are sacred
in the same way.
The opportunity for moral compromise of sacred values occurs whenever an individual confronts a situation
where a contemplated choice or action puts at risk those moral principles with which an individual and his group
strongly identify (Goodstein, 2000). Moral compromise involving what is sacralized are often resisted or refused
(Graham & Haidt, 2012). Previous research has shown that trading off sacred values is considered a taboo and
people express negative feelings even when contemplating this mere opportunity (Tetlock, 2003). For instance,
Hanselmann and Tanner (2008) argued that taboo trade-offs are negatively emotion-laden, because the deci-
sion-makers realize that something important is at stake and has to be protected. Authors have also found that
when a decision situation is associated with a sacred value (i.e., taboo trade-off), people perceive the task as
easier to solve compared with a situation not involving sacred values (i.e., routine trade-off). Performing a func-
tional MRI (fMRI) with volunteers who were faced with a series of decision tasks, Duc, Hanselmann, Boesiger,
and Tanner (2013) found that taboo trade-off proposals increased neuronal activations in the left anterior tem-
poral lobe and bilateral amygdalae – areas associated with rule-based processing and emotion - as well as sig-
nificant correlations between activations of the right amygdala and moral disgust ratings.
Following a social psychological approach, although people wish to protect their moral self-image (Monin &
Jordan, 2009) and want to see themselves as moral actors (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008; Nisan, 1991), studies
have also demonstrated that people recognize that moral concepts, like purity, can have different meanings de-
pending on the type of social relationship a given situation involves (Rai & Fiske, 2011). According to what is
known as moral flexibility (Bartels, 2008), contextual and societal factors could influence which values are more
relevant than others. Morgan, Skitka, and Wisneski (2010) argued that different individuals may see some is-
sues as relevant or irrelevant to morality. For example, people know that tax evasion is wrong, that it represents
a risk because there is a certain probability of being discovered and punished, and that it leads to higher taxes
for the remaining taxpayers. Empirical literature on the ethics of tax evasion reveals that, in general, there is
strong moral opposition to it (e.g., Bosco & Mittone, 1997). However, the opposition to tax evasion could be
weaker in a number of circumstances: cases in which the government engages in human rights abuses or ca-
ses in which the tax system is perceived as unfair (McGee, 2012). Which moral values become sacred for a
group is somewhat arbitrary, a function of cultural context and need (Ginges, 2015). McGraw and Tetlock
(2005) found that apparently absolute opposition to selling body organs on the marketplace was substantially
reduced when, for example, it was emphasized that this trade would save many lives. In other words, what
counts as a taboo trade-off varies dramatically across ideological subcultures, group-specific approaches to
morality, and historical periods (Tetlock, Peterson, & Lerner, 1996). There are many opportunities for reframing
issues that involve sacred values for groups. As in religions, values survive in time and in space because they
are readily rewritable in ways that are sensitive to changing contexts (Atran & Norenzayan, 2004). The way in
which moral values are relevant and sacralized could depend on collective reasons and could be based on a
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specific ingroup internalized conviction of right and wrong (Bartels et al., 2015). However, moral values can be
defined as sacred by means of a taboo against material trade-offs, with several implications for intergroup dy-
namics and conflicts. What gives sacred values their meaning and their moral status is their separation from the
profane domain of everyday life (Durkheim, 1955; Tetlock, 2003). Therefore, their defining characteristic is a
taboo against valuing moral values along a material or monetary scale (Ginges, Atran, Medin, & Shikaki, 2007).
Moral Sacredness and Political Ideology
The political arena is a field where moral convictions are the most debated and relevant for guiding the attitudes
and behavior of electors, parties, and candidates. Discussions around inviolable values abound in many funda-
mental political disputes (e.g., The right to life, LGBT+ rights or the death penalty), and they often make dis-
putes much harder to resolve. With regard to political issues, there is considerable variation in the degree to
which people’s opinions are vested with moral conviction (e.g., Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). Increased mo-
ral conviction about a given issue predicts increased prejudice toward those who have different views (Skitka et
al., 2005), as well as distrust of political authorities who have to work on the issue (Wisneski, Lytle, & Skitka,
2009). Skitka and colleagues (2005) found that attitudes held with strong moral conviction predicted greater so-
cial and physical distance from, and intolerance towards, dissimilar others, lower levels of good will and en-
gagement in attitudinally heterogeneous groups, and inability to generate procedural solutions to resolve disa-
greements.
Graham and Haidt (2010) argued that the most intractable political debates are likely to involve binding moral
foundations, whereas the greatest degree of commonality may be found in issues related to individualizing
ones. According to the Moral Foundations Theory (MFT; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Haidt & Graham, 2007), indi-
vidualizing foundations are related to care for and devotion to the discomfort of others (Harm / Care) and con-
cern for justice and rights (Fairness / Reciprocity); while binding foundations describe the concern for and inter-
est in social solidarity and responsibilities of group membership (Ingroup / Loyalty); social order, social role ful-
fillment and respect for traditions and institutions (Authority / Respect); and interest in control of impulses and
desires (Purity / Sanctity). Individualizing foundations are described as the source of those moral intuitions cor-
related with the liberal philosophical tradition with its emphasis on the rights and welfare of individuals. Individu-
alizing foundations are specific to a secular contractual society prioritizing individual rights and in which binding
foundations are less important, or even elicit racism, prejudice or nationalism, authoritarianism, homophobia
and disgust-based restrictions on the rights of women (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). Binding foundations correlate
with many conservative and religious moralities with their emphasis on group-binding loyalty (see also Graham
& Haidt, 2012), and tend to be supported by more conservative elements within a society. In general, conserva-
tives prefer a binding approach (i.e., They give similar evaluations on all five sets of moral foundations), where-
as liberals show a preference for an individualizing approach (i.e., They give higher evaluations on fairness and
harm moral foundations than on other foundations; Graham & Haidt, 2010; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009;
Graham et al., 2011; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). Testing the MF hypothesis in different
countries, Graham and colleagues (2011) found that liberalism / left-wing ideology sustains liberty and equality
as fundamental political goods, and so liberal people mainly support individual rights and the use of govern-
ment programs to extend such rights as widely - and as equally - as possible. On the other hand, the funda-
mental values of conservatism / right-wing ideology are found in their propensity to preserve the status quo in
human welfare and long-existing institutions, norms, and traditions across generations. Conservatives support
solid institutions and social control as necessary and they tend to believe that they are hard to replace if delegi-
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timized. However, these assumptions have not always been confirmed in all studies. For instance, Davis and
colleagues (2016) could not generalize the moral foundations hypothesis which predicted that conservatism
would positively correlate to binding foundations in black people in the United States.
Few studies used the Moral Foundation approach to investigate left-wing and right-wing moral reasoning in the
Italian context (D’Alberti, 2013; Di Battista, Pivetti, & Berti, 2018; Milesi, 2017). Across three studies carried out
in Italy from 2010 to 2013, Milesi (2017) found that the intention to vote for right-wing political groups rather
than for left-wing rivals is associated with concerns about sanctity. Results also showed that individualizing is
weakly related to political orientation, particularly in the dimension of care. Di Battista, Pivetti, and Berti (2018)
found that both Italian left and right-wingers attribute higher scores to individualizing moral foundations than to
binding ones. Right-wingers give similar evaluations on all five sets of moral foundations, whereas left-wingers
give higher evaluations on individualizing foundations than on the other foundations. These studies did not
measure moral foundations in a taboo trade-off framework.
In general, existing research measuring moral foundations in a taboo trade-off framework relies primarily on the
Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale (MFSS; see Graham et al., 2009). The MFSS is designed to measure an
individual’s willingness to violate moral norms in exchange for money (e.g., “Kick a dog in the head, hard”;
Graham et al., 2009). As far as we know, only one Italian study administered the MFSS (D’Alberti, 2013) in or-
der to study moral foundations and voting intentions in the Italian general election in 2013. The author found
that the correlations between the indexes obtained with two methods of measurement (moral foundations ques-
tionnaire and MFSS) were quite different. According to the MFSS measurement, the only relevant result was an
unexpectedly high foundation score for the political center. The Italian centrist faction seemed particularly sensi-
tive to the notion of asking for money in exchange for violating taboos. D’Alberti (2013) highlighted that an ex-
planation might lie in Italian political history. A centrist party such as Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democra-
cy) was traditionally the party with the closest ties to Catholics for a long period, namely, from the end of the
Second World War until the 1990s. A strong identification with Catholic values for the centrist parties might ex-
plain these high scores in the moral trade-off measure, but D’Alberti cannot explain why these scores weren’t
reflected in the moral foundations questionnaire.
Other studies, which aimed at measuring purity violations alone, have used scenarios involving incest and sex
with a dead chicken (Feinberg, Willer, Antonenko, & John, 2012; Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, &
Fugelsang, 2014), or vignettes involving incest and eating a pet dog (Eskine, Kacinik, & Prinz, 2011; Schnall,
Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). These specific scenarios and scales of moral compro-
mise are difficult to adapt to Italian participants, as they are generally against these violations. For instance, in
Italy incest and sexual relations between people and animals are punishable by law, therefore the moral applic-
ability of these sentences, scenarios, and items is complicated. For this reason, we suspect that items designed
to measure an individual’s willingness to violate moral norms in exchange for money as in previous studies will
be particularly rejected by participants, obscuring any difference between groups.
The Current Study
This study aims to better understand the moral quandaries people face when they debate sacred values and to
further the study of moral psychology and its link with political ideology in the Italian context, showing 1) how
compromise on moral foundations unveils the moral reasoning of the political left, center, and right in Italy; 2)
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which set of moral factors plays the most important role in these distinctions. The inclusion of the assessment
of omission as a compromises on moral foundations is useful for understanding the moral roots of the ideologi-
cal debates between groups. Furthermore, exploring moral psychology and judgments calls for different tools
and methods that can cover all moral domains. For these reasons, we aim to use a new tool to measure the
sacralization of moral foundations in a taboo trade-off context, drawing inspiration from the MFSS. We are inter-
ested in showing how a moral dilemma can conflict with the political groups’ internalized convictions of right and
wrong in the Italian context. Moral regret for compromise on moral foundations in some specific dilemmas could
explain what kind of morality a group and its members have. In line with the relevant research, MF hypothesis
predict that conservatives prefer the binding approach (i.e., They give similar evaluations on all five sets of mo-
ral foundations), whereas liberals show a preference for individualizing moral foundations when compared to
conservatives (Graham et al., 2009; Graham et al., 2011). Adapting Tetlock’s work on sacred values and taboo
trade-offs (Tetlock et al., 2000) to make moral judgments “personal and visceral” (Graham et al., 2009, p. 1036)
or personally relevant, Graham and colleagues (2009) showed participants’ resistance to contemplate a trade-
off. Liberals refused to make trade-offs on individualizing foundations but were more willing to perform actions
that violated the binding foundations. They were less likely than conservatives to see trade-offs related to bind-
ing foundations as violations of sacred values. The authors commented their results, finding that liberals mainly
justify moral rules in terms of their consequences for individuals; they are familiarized with balancing opposing
interests with the primary interest of individual care and rights. Conservatives, in contrast, are more likely not to
break moral rules, even when the consequences would be positive, because they justify these values as hand-
ed down from authorities, such as God, or from earlier generations. The authors highlighted that this deontolog-
ical reluctance to make trade-offs could be well detected by the methods used in the MFSS (Graham et al.,
2009). The opportunity for moral compromise on sacred values, putting at risk those moral principles with which
a group and its members strongly identify (Goodstein, 2000), could disclose which sets of foundations are truly
inviolable for the left and the right. In this study and in line with the literature (Graham et al., 2009; Graham et
al., 2011), it is hypothesized that Italian center - left morality relies heavily on the individualizing foundations that
people would not compromise by accepting money in exchange for violating them. On the other hand, we pre-
dict that those on the center - right would be less likely to violate binding foundations for money than left-wing-
ers. We also expect to find high scores on either individualizing or binding foundations for the political center,
which can represent those Italian political parties traditionally linked to religiousness (D’Alberti, 2013).
Specifically, in the assessment of moral foundations via a new moral compromise foundation scale, namely the
Omission as a Compromise on Moral Foundations scale (OC-MF), it is predicted that:
H1: Center and left-wing Italian participants would consider individualizing moral foundations as more
relevant (i.e., Lower willing to compromise on them) than binding foundations.
H2: Center and right-wing Italian participants would consider binding moral foundations as more rele-
vant (i.e., Lower willing to compromise on them) than left-wing Italian participants.
Confirmation of a two-factor structure of the OC-MF according to one of the principal two-factor models identi-
fied by Graham and colleagues (2011) is also expected.
The Research Context
Italy has a multi-party system characterized by rapidly changing governments. It is recognized as a Wester-
nized country with a modern liberal tradition with regard to the importance of the protection of each individual
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and his / her rights across every level of the political spectrum. Between 1996 and 2008, the Italian political
parties were organized into two large center-left and center-right coalitions. In 2013 the bipolar system was un-
settled by several new political actors and widespread political disaffection increased among Italian citizens
(Pasquino & Valbruzzi, 2013). However, despite the alleged end of ideologies (Bell, 1965) and despite the dis-
affection for specific parties, in Italy the relevance of the left-liberal and right-conservative distinction is still
present in the electors’ identification and represents a valuable organizing principle of the political space
(Baldassarri, 2013; Bellucci & Maraffi, 2014; Corbetta, Cavazza, & Roccato, 2009; Gries, 2017; Natale, 2006;
Vegetti, Poletti, & Segatti, 2013). Furthermore, due to growing political party fragmentation and unstable coali-
tions between parties, personal reasons (such as moral values or the vision of a “good society”) increase in
importance in people’s personal political orientation and identification, more significantly than previous tradition-
al indicators for political decision-making (such as geographical derivation, status, education, and occupation;
Caprara, Schwartz, Capanna, Vecchione, & Barbaranelli, 2006; Lakoff, 2004; Vecchione, Tullio, & Caprara,
2011; Westen, 2007).
Italian political leaders often invoke sacred values in their electoral programs and use them to discredit political
adversaries. The sacralization of the same moral imperative (i.e., The right to life) makes discussion between
political groups particularly unfeasible. Indeed, moral issues are often the focus of severe electoral debates on
the inviolability of certain issues.
Method
Participants
The convenience sample included 224 Italian participants recruited via snowball sampling with the collaboration
of research assistants. The majority (58.6%) were females (males 37.6%; 4% gender information missing).
Their mean age was 27.93 years (SD = 10.9; range 18-75). About 59.8% of the participants were students. As
for political orientation (M = 4.1; SD = 1.5), the sample was fairly balanced between left, right, and center, re-
vealing that 27.7% of the participants positioned themselves on the left of the left-right axis (from 1 to 3 on the
scale), whereas 27.7% positioned themselves in the center (point 4 on the scale), and 30.4% positioned them-
selves on the right (from 5 to 7) (14.3% did not report their political orientation). Participants who declared their
political party affiliation were a minor part of the total sample (n = 82; 36.6%).
Procedure
The research was carried out by the University G. d’Annunzio of Chieti-Pescara in Italy. The questionnaire was
implemented using a Google Drive Form and administered in the Italian regions of Abruzzo and Lazio. Partici-
pants were recruited via snowball sampling with the collaboration of researchers and doctoral students. They
posted the questionnaire link on social networks or sent it to the mailing lists of both close (e.g., Friends) and
more distant acquaintances (e.g., Colleagues) who were involved in political groups or who they deemed to be
very interested in political debates. The questionnaire took approximately 20 minutes to fill in.
The research complied with the Code of Ethics of the Italian Psychology Association (Associazione Italiana di
Psicologia [A.I.P.], 2015).
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Measures
The Omission as a Compromise on Moral Foundations Scale (OC-MF)
Individuals’ willingness to omit/neglect moral norms in exchange for money was measured. Following on from
studies relating to moral taboo trade-offs (Graham et al., 2009; Graham & Haidt, 2012; Tetlock et al., 2000) and
inspired by the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ; Graham et al., 2009; Graham et al., 2011), we gener-
ated items to measure compromise on moral foundations. Each item measures the violation of moral founda-
tions in exchange for money. In the MFSS by Graham and colleagues (2009), five potential taboo violations for
each moral foundation were administered. For example, the authors asked participants how much money
someone would have to pay them to: “Kick a dog in the head, hard” (for Harm); “Renounce their citizenship” (for
Ingroup); “Get a blood transfusion from a child molester” (for Purity). In order to test the applicability of the
MFSS in the Italian sample (Graham et al., 2009), we ran a pilot study adapting D’Alberti’s (2013) Italian trans-
lation of the MFSS. The scale was administered to a sample of 23 Italian undergraduate psychology students
who filled in the questionnaire during classwork. They were invited to carefully read, fill in and critically evaluate
the scale on their own. Then, students were invited to discuss their personal evaluation in groups of four/five
students each. After that, they were asked to answer to a semi-structured interview concerning the main strong
and weak points of the scale. The results suggested that the scale might be inadequate to measure sacred val-
ues in the Italian context, both in individuals and in groups. In particular, three problems emerged from the stu-
dents’ answers: 1) social desirability: many items of the scale refer to unacceptable issues for Italian culture
(e.g., “Stick a pin into the palm of a child you don’t know”); 2) MFSS items measure some aspects that in Italy
are considered crimes, antisocial behavior or cruelty rather than moral concerns (e.g., “Kick a dog in the head,
hard”); 3) some items are not suitable for the morality of Italians, as they are not as nationalistic as citizens of
other countries (e.g., “Curse the founders or early heroes of your country (in private, nobody can hear you)”).
Similarly, Davis and colleagues (2016) found that the specific items on the moral foundations questionnaire as-
sessing loyalty to one’s country and loyalty to one’s family may not be strongly aligned in some subsamples.
For example, among black people in the United States, some individuals may feel very loyal to their family and
community, but feel less loyalty towards their country. This might be true in Italy as well.
However, the moral trade-off framework appeared to us very suitable for measuring the moral inviolability that
makes moral foundations sacred. Graham and colleagues (2009) argued that the MFSS is a measure that
makes moral judgments more “personal and visceral” (p. 1036) than in other instruments used in MF theory
and studies, eliciting personally relevant responses by presenting subjects with moral trade-offs. We generated
potential compromises on moral foundations in a moral trade-off framework, partially drawing inspiration for the
wording from the moral relevance scale of the MFQ (reported in Graham et al., 2009, Appendix A). This MFQ
scale offers a decontextualized method that is appropriate for assessing moral values as values that are said to
be generalized across contexts (e.g., “When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are
the following considerations relevant to your thinking: Whether or not someone acted unfairly [for fairness];
Whether or not someone violated standards of purity and decency [for purity]”; Graham et al., 2009). Drawing
inspiration from this scale, 17 items to measure compromise on moral foundations were generated (6 items for
individualizing - 2 items for fairness and 4 for harm, and 11 items for binding - 3 for ingroup, 3 for authority, 5 for
purity). Participants first read: “How much money would someone have to pay you not to…”. They then rated
items (e.g., “To show compassion towards those who suffer” [for Individualizing]; “To be clean and fresh” [for
Binding, see Table 1]) using a specific response scale that measures an omission rather than active behavior.
Participants were asked to evaluate items on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 = I would not agree to do it for
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money, to 7 = I would agree to do it even for less than 10 Euros (see Table 1). We expected people to be more
willing to accept a financial offer for a transgression when the sacred values are presented as passive as op-
posed to active behavior (Ayanian & Berwick, 1991; Baron & Ritov, 2004; Feinberg, 1984). Because of the
“omission bias”, transgressions caused by omission or inaction have been found to be less relevant than those
that are caused by action (Ayanian & Berwick, 1991; Baron & Ritov, 2004; Feinberg, 1984). Similarly, according
to the “action principle” (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006), it is easier for people to abstain from moral behav-
ior than to explicitly refuse to act morally. Active and passive transgressions are treated differently by the law
(Feinberg, 1984) and are judged and weighed differently by spectators (e.g., Baron & Ritov, 2004; Spranca,
Minsk, & Baron, 1991), producing different effects of social desirability. For instance, participants are more likely
to serve their self-interest by refraining from telling the truth (lie of omission) than by deliberately lying (lie of
commission) when they face the temptation to benefit from dishonesty (Pittarello, Motro, Rubaltelli, & Pluchino,
2016).
The Moral Relevance Scale
Twenty-three assessments of the moral relevance scale of the MFQ collecting participants’ evaluation of the
abstract concepts of moral foundations (see Graham et al., 2009) were administered as well. Participants first
read: “When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the following considerations
relevant to your thinking?”. They then rated moral relevance items using a 7-point scale (from 1 = not at all; to 7
= very much).
Political Ideology
Participants’ political orientation was assessed on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (= Left) to 7 (= Right). A sim-
ple one-dimensional spectrum of left–right or liberal–conservative represented political orientation well
(Corbetta et al., 2009; Jost, 2006; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). Haidt and Graham (2007) con-
firmed the fact that political ideology and orientation can be self-assessed and that the unidimensional left-right
construct has common meaning across cultures, despite differences in political and historical background.
One open-ended question assessed participants’ affiliation with a specific political party within the Italian politi-
cal context (“Which political party do you vote for?”).
The socio-demographic section probed participants’ age and gender.
Results
Confirmatory Factor Analyses
To evaluate the adequacy of the OC-MF, we performed a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) on all 17 items,
and re-specified the model by looking at the standardized residual covariances between the items (Jöreskog &
Sörbom, 1984): large values (above 2 in absolute value) were used for indicating that the model was not cor-
rect. Therefore, the items with largest standardized residual covariances were discarded one by one while look-
ing at the improvement in goodness-of-fit indices. The final model included 14 items: three items for each di-
mension of care, ingroup, authority and purity, and two items for fairness (see items in Table 1).
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OC-MF subscale Individualizing Binding
Harm
H1: To show compassion towards those who suffer .52
H2: To care for those who suffer .62
H3: To listen to someone who suffers .63
Fairness
F1: To be correct and honest .65
F2: To be fair .67
Ingroup
I1: To be loyal to your family .39
I2: To be loyal to your friends .46
I3: To be loyal to your country .60
Authority
A1: To respect your cultural traditions .68
A2: To respect social hierarchies .63
A3: To obey your authorities .72
Purity
P1: To be faithful .42
P2: To be clean and fresh .40
P3: To be pure in your soul .49
Note. OC-MF = Omission as a Compromise on Moral Foundations Scale.
The model fit of the hierarchical models containing two superordinate factors (individualizing and binding) was
assessed using IBM SPSS AMOS 25.0 software. The fit indices showed an acceptable model fit (χ2 = 174.16;
df = 72; p < .001; χ2/df = 2.42; CFI = .91; RMSEA = .08; Bentler, 1995). The correlation between the two super-
ordinate factors was significant and positive (r = .70; p < .001), and the factor loadings were highly significant (p
< .001) (see Figure 1). To test an alternative model with a single superordinate factor, a second CFA was run.
Fit indices on an alternative CFA model with a single superordinate factor were not as good (χ2 = 196.54; df =
73, p < .001; χ2/df = 2.69; CFI = .89; RMSEA = .09) and therefore, the first model with two superordinate factors
was retained.
With regard to individualizing, the Corrected Item-Total Correlations ranged from .52 to .67; with regard to bind-
ing, the Corrected Item-Total Correlations ranged from .39 to .72 (see Table 1). These coefficients showed that
all of the individual items were associated with their respective subscale and were higher than the rule of thumb
minimum value of 0.2 (Kline, 1986). Internal consistency was examined using Cronbach’s Alpha computed for
the two subscales. Means, Standard Deviations, Cronbach’s Alpha, and Inter-Correlations between individualiz-
ing and binding foundations measured with the OC-MF and the moral relevance scale are reported in Table 2.
All the items of the scale were reversed. Firstly, the items for the 5 subscales of harm, fairness, ingroup, author-
ity and purity were averaged; secondly the average of the subscales harm and fairness built the individual foun-
dation scale, and the average of the ingroup, authority and purity subscales built the binding foundation scale.
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Figure 1. Hierarchical model for the OC-MF.
***p < .001.
The individualizing and binding foundations, assessed through the OC-MF, were related to the same constructs
measured with the moral relevance instrument (individualizing: r = .39; p < .001; binding: r = .54; p < .001),
even if the correlation for individualizing was only of medium effect size, and thus of low convergent validity.
Individualizing and binding measures were related both in the OC-MF (r = .53; p < .001) and in the moral rele-
vance scale (r = .47; p < .001), and the difference between these two correlations was not significant (Cohen’s
q = .08; see Cohen, 1988). Political orientation was related to binding foundations, both in the OC-MF (binding:
r = .25; p < .001) and in the moral relevance scale (binding: r = .27; p = < .001), and the difference between
these two correlations was not significant (Cohen’s q = .021); individualizing foundations were not related to
political orientation, either in the OC-MF (individualizing: r = -.03), or in the moral relevance scale (individualiz-
ing: r = -.04).
Table 2
Means, Standard Deviations, Reliabilities, and Inter-Correlations Between the Measures
Measure M SD α 1 2 3 4
OC-MF
1. Individualizing 6.25 0.98 .82 1 .53 .39 .28
2. Binding 5.84 1.08 .82 1 .27 .54
Moral Relevance
3. Individualizing 6.10 0.80 .90 1 .47
4. Binding 5.28 1.09 .85 1
Note. All correlations are significant, p < .001.
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Hypotheses Testing
In order to test hypotheses 1 and 2, a Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), with political orienta-
tion (left, center, and right) as a between-subjects factor and moral compromise foundations (individualizing and
binding) as a within-subject factor was run. The ANOVA yielded a significant main effect for moral compromise
foundations, F(1, 189) = 40.89, p < .001, ηp2 = .18, showing that all the participants refused to compromise more
on individualizing (M = 6.25; SD = 0.97) than on binding moral foundations (M = 5.79; SD = 1.09), and a signifi-
cant main effect of political orientation, F(2, 189) = 5.71, p = .004, ηp2 = .06, indicating that center and right-
wingers endorsed a greater aversion to compromise on all moral foundations (Mcenter = 6.23; SD = 0.91; Mright =
6.11; SD = 0.92) than Left-wingers (Mleft = 5.73; SD = 0.78). Moreover, these main effects were qualified by a
reliable interaction between moral compromise foundations and political orientation, F(2, 189) = 10.12, p
< .001, ηp2 = .10. A simple effect analysis showed that center and left-wingers refused to compromise more on
the individualizing than on binding moral foundations, Left: F(1, 189) = 42, p < .001; ηp2 = .18; Center: F(1, 189)
= 16.78, p < .001; ηp2 =.08, whereas a non-significant effect emerged with regard to right-wingers, F(1, 189) =
0.12, p = .73; ηp2 = .001, supporting H1 (see Figure 2). Furthermore, in line with H2, a significant effect for moral
compromise binding foundations emerged across the levels of political orientation, F(2, 189) = 10.08, p < .001;
ηp2 =.10, whereas the effect for moral compromise individualizing foundations across the levels of political orien-
tation was non-significant, F(2, 189) = 2.86, p = .06; ηp2 = .03. Left-wing participants indicated lower aversion to
compromise on binding moral foundations than any other study group (Center: p = .001; Right: p < .001),
whereas center and right wingers showed no difference (p = .51), supporting H2 (see Figure 2).
Figure 2. Individualizing and binding moral compromise foundations according to the level of political orientation.
Note. Higher scores indicate greater aversion to compromise on moral foundations. Error bars represent 95% confidence
intervals.
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Discussion
The study explored some types of compromise on sacred or inviolable moral foundations across different politi-
cal orientations in Italy. The OC-MF, a new measure based on omission as a part of compromise on moral foun-
dations, was introduced. The Moral Foundations perspective (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007;
Haidt & Joseph, 2004) guided the development of the instrument, which was designed not only to show the
relevance attributed to a particular set of moral foundations in relation to political orientation in Italy, but also to
identify the “sacralization” of individualizing and binding foundations using an innovative taboo trade-off frame-
work. Its factor structure confirmed the presence of two dimensions of moral compromise foundations, namely
individualizing and binding. The OC-MF also fairly corresponded to the existing scale of moral relevance found
in the MFQ. The instrument we put forward has proved to be consistent with the moral foundations hypothesis.
The findings showed that Italian center- and left-wing participants consider individualizing moral foundations as
more relevant and inviolable than binding foundations. Italian center and right-wing participants consider bind-
ing moral foundations as more relevant and inviolable than Italian left-wing participants. Italian participants posi-
tioned at the center of the political spectrum were found to show a binding approach that was similar to right-
wingers, but also high levels of individualizing foundations, comparable to those of left-wingers, in line with the
previous Italian study by D’Alberti (2013). A strong identification with Catholic values for center parties might
explain the relevance attributed to binding foundations, because these foundations in fact tend to be reinforced
by the most conservative and religious elements within a society (see also Graham & Haidt, 2012). According
to Bobbio, Matteucci, and Pasquino (1976), those participants from the center could represent either the mod-
erate area of politics or the undecided voters. In Italy, the area of the political center is characterized by dissimi-
lar political affiliations and parties ranging from left to right.
Furthermore, it was found that everyone’s morality relies heavily on individualizing foundations. In other words,
the findings suggested that left, center, and conservatives express particular aversion to compromise on justice
issues and care for the discomfort of others. The results challenged previous findings which showed that liber-
als care more than conservatives about individualizing issues (Graham et al., 2009, Studies 1 and 2), but were
in line with studies which measured “sacredness” reactions to taboo trade-offs (Graham et al., 2009, Study 3).
In line with Graham and Haidt (2012), concerns about the rights of individuals and their freedom seem so wide-
spread that they might be said to be universal. Also in the Italian context, individualizing moral foundations
could represent a shared point of view between left- and right-wingers. Milesi (2017) argued that in systems
which are not perfectly bipolar, and in fragmented and unstable electoral contexts, such as Italy, voters who
have seemingly opposite political positions do share some moral concerns.
In general, the OC-MF offers new understanding of moral reasoning with regard to the transgression of sacred
values in terms of passive behaviors. Choosing to actively act in order to violate a moral norm can elicit a
strong negative social and emotional response, inhibiting considerations of a compromise on moral founda-
tions. On the contrary, we assumed it to be easier for people to contemplate the mere opportunity of a compro-
mise on moral foundations when they can choose to omit moral behaviors (Baron & Ritov, 2004). This is in line
with Cushman and colleagues’ (2006) finding that participants viewed harm-inflicting acts of omission as more
permissible than harm-inflicting acts of commission. Furthermore, the OC-MF framework has the potential to
bring out the inviolability of some moral values on which it is impossible to compromise, making debates so
difficult between different political orientations in Italy.
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Implications
Disagreements over sacred values, particularly those associated with political ideology, abound in many public
debates, making disputes very hard to resolve (Bazerman, Tenbrunsel, & Wade-Benzoni, 2008; Susskind et al.,
2005). In line with Argo and Ginges (2015), regardless of whether sacred values are openly elicited in a group
discussion, they must be acknowledged and considered in political debates. Good strategies for negotiations
involve understanding how sacred values can affect decision making. Understanding moral sacredness associ-
ated with a given issue is relevant in order to suggest possible spaces and limits regarding negotiations (Atran
& Axelrod, 2008). Liberals and conservatives are divided on many issues, including abortion, LGBT+ rights,
women’s rights, gun ownership and more, and such differences help to explain many of the contrasting stances
the two sides take (Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, & Wetherell, 2014; Caprara et al., 2006; Graham et
al., 2009). However, our findings suggested that in a taboo trade-off framework, individualizing moral founda-
tions could be equally inviolable for left, center, and right, and in this sense this common point of view could
serve as counterweight in political debates. This is partially in line with Schein and Gray’s (2015) finding that,
despite moral diversity regarding specific issues (e.g., Patriotism, chastity), moral cognition in both liberals and
conservatives is rooted in a harm-based template. Moreover, our findings also suggested the consideration that
a compromise on binding moral foundations is seen differently by left, center, and right-wing participants, and
thus sacred positions relating binding foundations may be representative of the most intractable political de-
bates (in line with Graham & Haidt, 2010).
Gibson (2011) found that one of the greatest potential problems causing impasse in decisions involving sacred
values is that parties do not consider the extent to which some values are “priceless” for the competing sides,
and said sides are not willing to work within those constraints (see also Argo & Ginges, 2015). However, the
literature also suggested that there are ways that people across the ideological spectrum can make their stance
understandable to a person from the other side. For instance, Voelkel and Feinberg (2018) found that a moral
reframing technique can be used to overcome the rigid stances partisans often hold and help to develop politi-
cal acceptance. Furthermore, a capacity for contextual understanding of moral concerns is important in order to
solve complex social problems when multiple moral reasonings are conflicting, such as in the case of abortion
or LGBT+ rights. This capacity is also important for living in groups with different moral values or in groups that
prioritize the same moral values differently (Atran & Axelrod, 2008). Skitka, Washburn, and Carsel (2015) found
that people do not accept or expect their moral convictions to be contextually contingent or situationally varia-
ble, and tend to be offended by the idea that morality can be relative. For example, people morally convinced
that abortion is wrong are likely to believe it is objectively and universally wrong and that it should be universally
banned. In the context of international political negotiations, Argo and Ginges (2015) argued that this rhetoric
reinforces absolutism, turning decision making into an irresolvable conflict in which people inflexibly refuse to
manage creative solutions. Similarly, in the political field, Zagrebelsky (2008) described two different or even
conflicting moral approaches. The first is a strict approach that leads to a rigid defence of moral values, unlikely
to be negotiated or reframed depending on the context. For instance, the “right to life” could be sacralized and
abortion would therefore be forbidden in all cases. On the basis of the second perspective, moral issues are
rewritable in accordance with each specific and concrete situation. In this case, abortion could be viewed as a
restriction of the right to life of the fetus that is opposed to and conflicting with the woman’s right to health care;
according to an attentive evaluation of these two conflicting situations, the second perspective generally pre-
vails and States are obliged to respect, protect, and fulfill the woman’s right, as, unlike a fetus, she is already a
person.
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Drawing inspiration from Gibson (2011), Argo and Ginges (2015) suggested that for a successful political nego-
tiation it is necessary to be aware of when individuals are conflating a sacred position with sacred values. A
conceptual clarification could allow for the reframing of sacred values so that they are preserved even in the
face of a moral compromise. The authors argued that a good negotiation process emphasizes that sometimes
a compromise is the only way one could retain at least some portion of the sacred. A complete discussion of
those strategies enabling individuals and groups to negotiate on sacred values is beyond the scope of this pa-
per, however some examples concerning the Italian specificities may provide constructive suggestions. Over
the course of more than thirty years, one of the most violent political quarrels on issues with moral implications
was focused on LGBT+ rights. In May 2016, the Italian Parliament gave its final approval to a law providing
same-sex couples with many of the rights arising out of marriage (Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana,
2016). The proposal supported by the Prime Minister Matteo Renzi and the left-wing coalition was postponed
several times as a result of obstructionist opposition on the part of conservative and Catholics forces, who pre-
sented a barrage of amendments against the law (Tonacci, 2014). Italian conservative parties accused left-wing
parties of not protecting the interests of the “natural family”, sacred values that are implied in the binding ap-
proach. Luigi Manconi, who was the President of the Italian Human Rights Commission, argued that the im-
passe in the approval of a law was mostly due to a debate between all the opposite parties that do not get in
the right common perspective: the equal dignity of persons (Tonacci, 2014). A compromise was possible after a
long negotiation on the need to distinguish same-sex partnerships, social units compliant with Articles 2 and 3
of the Italian Constitution, from families as natural gatherings as per Article 29 of said Constitution. This refram-
ing enabled a compromise because both parties could adopt a version of their position which left their sacred
values unchanged. For instance, the left-wing coalition emphasized the importance of the new law, stating that
it was better than the previous arrangement and reprioritizing the issue of a full regulation of LGBT+ issues for
the near future. The right-wing coalition and Catholic forces changed their sacred position against same-sex
unions, accepting a norm where a compromise over their sacred values of the traditional family would no longer
be necessary. A breakthrough was reached by recognizing that the political positions were not merely conflict-
ing, but ultimately complementary when viewed in the broader perspective of long-term societal success.
Limitations
The study had some important limitations that must be kept in mind when interpreting the results. One limit is
the correlational nature of the research and the low representativeness of the convenience sample, mainly
made up of participants from central and southern Italy. Future research should explore compromise on moral
foundations in a more extensive Italian sample. We failed to insert a new measure of political affiliation. The
majority of participants refused to report the party they do or would vote for. In view of the rapid evolution of the
Italian political context, the widespread political dissatisfaction, and the lack of confidence in the party system
that was observed in other studies (Bellucci & Maraffi, 2014; Martini & Quaranta, 2015), we should add new
measures of political ideology and political disaffection. Furthermore, in future studies a sixth moral foundation
should be explored, namely Liberty / oppression (Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012), describing the
feelings of resentment people feel toward those who dominate them and restrict their liberty.
Conclusion
In this study, moral foundations were measured in a taboo trade-off framework among Italian participants, find-
ing that political orientation correlates with moral foundations as sacred values. The new scale shows the hy-
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pothesized differences between Italian political groups: the left prioritizes individualizing foundations as op-
posed to binding ones in a context of moral dilemma, whereas conservatives and centrists have a broader idea
of sacredness. This deep understanding of the opponents’ sacred values could offer new opportunities to im-
prove ideological debates in the political arena. Although there is still much to learn about what leads people to
have strong sacred values and about the full range of consequences of these attitudes, these results point to-
wards a deeper understanding of the role that moral concerns may play in different ideological viewpoints in
Italy.
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